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In Brief
Ebola virus genomes from 232 patients
sampled over 7 months in Sierra Leone
were sequenced. Transmission of
intrahost genetic variants suggests a
sufficiently high infectious dose during
transmission. The human host may have
caused direct alterations to the Ebola
virus genome.
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The 2013–2015 Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic is
caused by the Makona variant of Ebola virus (EBOV).
Early in the epidemic, genome sequencing provided
insights into virus evolution and transmission and
offered important information for outbreak response.
Here, we analyze sequences from 232 patients
sampled over 7 months in Sierra Leone, along with
86 previously released genomes from earlier in the
epidemic. We confirm sustained human-to-human
transmission within Sierra Leone and find no evi-1516 Cell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authorsdence for import or export of EBOV across national
borders after its initial introduction. Using high-depth
replicate sequencing, we observe both host-to-host
transmission and recurrent emergence of intrahost
genetic variants. We trace the increasing impact of
purifying selection in suppressing the accumulation
of nonsynonymous mutations over time. Finally,
we note changes in the mucin-like domain of EBOV
glycoprotein that merit further investigation. These
findings clarify the movement of EBOV within the re-
gion and describe viral evolution during prolonged
human-to-human transmission.
INTRODUCTION
The 2013–2015 Western African Ebola virus disease (EVD)
epidemic, caused by the Ebola virus (EBOV) Makona variant
(Kuhn et al., 2014), is the largest EVD outbreak to date, with
26,648 cases and 11,017 deaths documented as of May 8,
2015 (WHO, 2015). The outbreak, first declared in March 2014
in Guinea and traced back to the end of 2013 (Baize et al.,
2014), has also devastated the neighboring countries of Sierra
Leone and Liberia, with additional cases scattered across the
globe. Never before has an EBOV variant been transmitted
among humans for such a sustained period of time.
Published EBOV Makona genomes from clinical samples ob-
tained early in the outbreak in Guinea (three patients) and Sierra
Leone (78 patients) (Baize et al., 2014; Gire et al., 2014) demon-
strated that near-real-time sequencing could provide valuable
information to researchers involved in the global outbreak
response. Analysis of these genomes revealed that the outbreak
likely originated from a single introduction into the human popu-
lation in Guinea at the end of 2013 and was then sustained exclu-
sively by human-to-human transmissions. Genomic sequencing
further allowed the identification of numerous mutations
emerging in the EBOV Makona genome over time. As a conse-
quence, the evolutionary rate of the Makona variant over the
time span of the early phase of the outbreak could be estimated
and predictions made about the potential of this new EBOV
variant to escape current candidate vaccines, therapeutics,
and diagnostics (Kugelman et al., 2015a).
While the insights gleaned from sequencing early in the
outbreak informed public health efforts (Alizon et al., 2014; Sta-
dler et al., 2014; Volz and Pond, 2014), the continued human-
to-human spread of the virus raises questions about ongoing
evolution and transmission of EBOV. Our laboratory teams in Si-
erra Leone, at Kenema (Kenema Government Hospital [KGH])
and at Bo (US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
[CDC]), continued to perform active diagnosis and surveillance
in Sierra Leone following our initial study (Gire et al., 2014). After
a 6-month delay of sample shipment due to regulatory uncer-
tainty about inactivation protocols, we again began to determine
EBOV genome sequences. We have sequenced samples at high
depth and with technical replicates to characterize genetic
diversity of EBOV both within (intrahost) and between (interhost)
individuals. To support global outbreak termination efforts, we
publicly released these genomes prior to publication as they
were generated, starting with a first set of 45 sequences in
December 2014 and continuing with regular releases of hun-
dreds of sequences through May 2015.
Here, we provide an analysis of 232 new, coding-complete
EBOVMakona genomes from Sierra Leone. We compared these
genomes to 86 previously available genomes: 78 unique ge-
nomes from Sierra Leone (Gire et al., 2014), 3 genomes from
Guinea (Baize et al., 2014), and 5 from healthcare workers in-
fected in Sierra Leone and treated in Europe. We use this com-
bined data set obtained from 318 EVD patients during the height
of the epidemic in Sierra Leone and Guinea to better understand
EBOV transmission within Sierra Leone and between countries.
In addition, we use it to understand viral population dynamics
within individual hosts, the impact of natural selection, and thecharacteristics of the now hundreds of new mutations that
have emerged over the longer course of the epidemic.
RESULTS
232 New Ebola Virus Makona Genomes from Sierra
Leone
We performed massively parallel genome sequencing on 673
samples from two EVD patient cohorts. The first cohort included
575 blood samples from 484 EVD patients confirmed by labora-
tory staff at KGH from June 16 through September 28, 2014. The
second cohort included blood samples from 88 EVD patients
from throughout Sierra Leone confirmed at Bo by CDC labora-
tory staff from August 20, 2014 through January 10, 2015. Sam-
ples from both EVD cohorts were sequenced using previously
described methods (Experimental Procedures; Matranga et al.,
2014; Gire et al., 2014).
We implemented a new computational pipeline, viral-
ngs:v1.0.0, for viral genomic de novo assembly, intrahost variant
calling, and genome analysis and annotation. This pipeline is
available via open-source software (Park et al., 2015) and utilizes
a generalized workflow engine to run on a wide variety of com-
puter hardware configurations (Ko¨ster and Rahmann, 2012).
Through a partnership with DNAnexus, this pipeline is also avail-
able in a secure cloud-compute environment to enable consis-
tent analyses across laboratories with limited computational
resources (Experimental Procedures).
Using this pipeline, we successfully assembled 232 EBOVMa-
kona coding-complete genomes (150 from KGH and 82 from the
CDC cohort, spanning June 16 to December 26, 2014). Each
assembled sequence was at least 18.5 kb in length, with a
maximum of 6% ambiguous base calls per genome. The median
assembly had 3743 coverage, was 18.9 kb long, and had no
ambiguous bases. Despite extensive sequencing, successful
full-genome assembly was difficult to obtain from the KGH
cohort (73% failed genome assemblies; 3743 mean coverage;
Table S1), compared to a previous cohort from the same labora-
tory, described in Gire et al. (2014) (11% failed genome assem-
blies; 2,0003mean coverage). The high assembly failure rate of
the more recent KGH cohort is likely due to the mandatory in-
country implementation of a new EBOV sample deactivation pro-
tocol and to long delays for sample shipments amidst the
outbreak response (see Experimental Procedures). In contrast,
only 7% of samples from the CDC cohort failed to assemble.
However, these samples had been pre-selected for sequencing
based on high EBOV titers, as estimated by qPCR. In addition,
the CDC cohort samples were collected more recently, did not
remain in lysis buffer for an extended period, and were subjected
to a different sample deactivation protocol than the KGH cohort
samples.
While we are continuing attempts to glean genomic informa-
tion from compromised samples of the recent KGH cohort,
important information may have been lost. In particular, samples
from many EBOV-infected health-care workers at KGH, which
could provide important insights into hospital-based transmis-
sions, were compromised.
In combination with the 86 previously published EBOV Ma-
kona genomes (Gire et al., 2014), we analyzed a total of 318Cell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authors 1517
genomes (see Experimental Procedures), all aligned against the
earliest sampled Guinean genome (GenBank: KJ660346.2). In
this set, we observed 464 single-nucleotide polymorphisms
(SNPs; 125 nonsynonymous, 176 synonymous, and 163 non-
coding). We also observed five single-base insertions and two
double-base insertions in noncoding regions. We mapped all
of the variants to primer-binding sites for known sequence-
based diagnostics (Kugelman et al., 2015a) and found no muta-
tions in these sites that were present in more than one Sierra
Leonean sample (Table S2).
We constructed a second, independent genome library for
each of 150 high-quality samples from the KGH cohort to reliably
determine intrahost single-nucleotide variants (iSNVs) at low
frequencies (Gire et al., 2014). We identified 247 iSNVs (25 inser-
tion/deletions that were excluded from all analyses, 73 nonsy-
nonymous, 71 synonymous, and 78 noncoding), including 21
iSNVs shared by multiple patients.
Very recently, another 175 EBOV Makona genomes were
published based on a cohort from Sierra Leone, mostly sampled
from the area of Freetown in the Fall of 2014 (Tong et al., 2015).
Although these data were not included in our analyses, they are
unlikely to significantly alter our primary findings (Figure S1).
Limited Ebola Virus Exchange across the Sierra
Leonean Border
A previous study of EBOV Makona sequences elucidated viral
transmission and evolution during the early stages of the
outbreak in Sierra Leone (Gire et al., 2014) from late May to early
June, 2014. The first reported EVD cases in Sierra Leone
stemmed from two genetically distinct EBOV Makona lineages,
believed to have been introduced from Guinea. One of these lin-
eages (SL1) was more closely related to the then-available three
Guinean genomes (two to five mutations) than the second line-
age (SL2), which was characterized by four additional mutations.
This finding suggested that SL2 had evolved from SL1 some
months before it was observed in Sierra Leone. A third lineage
(SL3), derived from SL2, emerged in mid-June 2014. SL3 differs
fromSL2 by a singlemutation at position 10,218, first found as an
intrahost variant (polymorphism within one individual) at a low
frequency. SL3 became the most prevalent lineage in Sierra
Leone during the first 3 weeks of the outbreak there, with SL1
disappearing soon after the appearance of SL3. The SL3-
defining mutation is epidemiologically important, as it is the first
commonly circulating mutation observed to arise within Sierra
Leone’s borders.
As the epidemic developed within Sierra Leone, the SL3 line-
age continued to dominate the viral population within the coun-
try, with no evidence for additional imported EBOV lineages. In
our data set, 97% of the genomes carry the SL3 mutation and
the remainder belong to SL2 (Figure 1A). These results link all Si-
erra Leonean EVD cases to the initial introduction of EBOV into
Sierra Leone, and they provide further evidence that all EVD
cases during this outbreak arose from human-to-human trans-
mission rather than from further zoonotic introductions from
the unknown EBOV reservoir. Thismeans that no newly imported
viral diversity was detected after the initial introduction (Gire
et al., 2014); all newly sampled viruses likely descended from
those sequenced in the initial weeks of the outbreak. The genetic1518 Cell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authorssimilarity of these viruses suggests that importation from other
countries was minimal, although we cannot definitively rule out
a re-introduction from elsewhere for the SL2 viruses (3%) in
our data set.
Similarly, publicly available EBOV genomes from this outbreak
can shed light on exportation of EBOV from Sierra Leone into
other countries. All published genomes from elsewhere,
including 26 from Liberia and 4 from Mali, lack the Sierra
Leone-defining SL3 mutation (Figure 1B and Experimental Pro-
cedures). Given that 97% of Sierra Leonean EBOV sequences
have the SL3 variant, extensive exportation would result in the
spread of SL3 EBOV genomes, a spread that is not seen in
the limited samples available to date. At least in Sierra Leone,
and with the exception of events at the onset of the epidemic,
transmission has likely been primarily within national borders
(Figure S2 and Experimental Procedures), rather than by free
interchange with neighboring countries.
Human-to-Human Transmission of Multiple EBOV
Genomes
Intrahost variants (iSNVs) that appear during the course of the
epidemic may provide valuable information about human-to-hu-
man transmission. In particular, shared iSNVs have been used to
estimate the relative size of the transmission bottleneck (Emmett
et al., 2015) and to identify human-to-human transmission chains
(Gire et al., 2014). In the current data set, which includes 85
samples with at least one iSNV (Figure S3A), several iSNVs are
shared among two or more patients, often spanning several
months of the EVD epidemic (Figure 2A). The existence of shared
iSNVs could be explained by patient infection frommultiple sour-
ces (superinfection), sample contamination, recurring mutations
(with or without balancing selection to reinforce mutations), or
co-transmission of slightly diverged viruses that arose by muta-
tion earlier in the transmission chain.
We can rule out superinfection and contamination as primary
explanations for the iSNVs in our data because none of the iSNVs
are located at common SNP positions. For example, a SNP at
position 14,019 is at intermediate frequency in the population
(found in 40% of samples we sequenced) and defines the
SL4 lineage (Figure 1A). If superinfection were common among
EVD patients, we would expect to sometimes see both SL3
and SL4 viruses in the same patient, which would appear as
an iSNV at that position. Contamination would result in a similar
pattern, with intermediate-frequency SNPs appearing as iSNVs
in contaminated samples. Additionally, contamination would
be most visible in low-coverage, low-RNA-content samples
because contaminants would make up more of the RNA avail-
able for sequencing, whereas samples with extremely high
coverage would be the most visible contaminants (Figure S3B).
The highest coverage sample (G4960.1) contains genomes
belonging to lineage SL3 only and lacks the SL4 SNP, so if there
were widespread contamination, we would see a low-frequency
iSNV at position 14,019 in SL4 samples with iSNVs. Since SL3
and SL4 samples were processed together (eight of nine
sequencing batches contained multiple samples from both line-
ages) and we saw no instances of an iSNV at that position, we
conclude that superinfection and contamination are not impor-
tant contributors to iSNVs.
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Figure 1. Within and between Country Genomic Relationships of Ebola Virus Makona
(A) Phylogenetic and temporal placement of recently sequenced Ebola virus (EBOV) within Sierra Leone. New EBOV genomes (232 genomes, dark blue), sampled
from June 16 through December 26, 2014, provide a high-resolution view of the accumulated genetic diversity and fill in the missing ancestry between EBOV
Makona genome data sets. The maximum clade credibility (MCC) tree was inferred using Bayesian evolutionary analysis by sampling trees (BEAST), with tips
anchored to sampling date. Tips are labeled for EBOV from five non-African health-care workers (HCWs) infected in Sierra Leone and treated in Europe
(sequenced by other groups, light green). Previously described nested EBOVMakona lineages SL1, SL2, and SL3 Gire et al. (2014), as well as a new lineage SL4,
are labeled at their most-recent common ancestor (MRCA) nodes.
(B) Lack of EBOV Makona SL3 spread to Liberia or Mali. Shown is a median-joining haplotype network constructed from a coding-complete EBOV genome
alignment including 340 EBOV Makona sequences. Each colored vertex represents a sampled viral haplotype, with colors indicating countries of origin. Colors
are as in (A), with the exception that the distinction is no longer made between older (Gire) and newer (Park) Sierra Leonean data sets (both are now dark blue), and
two additional countries are shown (Liberia in yellow, Mali in red). The size of the each vertex is relative to the number of sampled isolates. Hatch marks indicate
the number of mutations along each edge.
See also Figures S1 and S2.The remaining possible sources for persistently shared iSNVs
are co-transmission and recurrent mutation. In either case, the
iSNV could be maintained by balancing selection or could be
evolving neutrally. Figure 2A suggests that selection is not the
primary cause of persistence, since synonymous and nonsynon-
ymous variants are equally common among the shared iSNVs,
and selective pressures are likely to be different for the two
classes of variant. All shared iSNVs are unlikely to be simply
the product of recurring mutation: if they were, they should
have a frequency spectrum heavily weighted toward low
frequency, characteristic of new mutations. However, that is
not the case. For example, the variant at position 18,911 is foundat >15% frequency in eight different samples (Figure S3C), a
much higher frequency than expected if the change represented
a de novo mutation in each sample.
In summary, we conclude that a combination of human-to-
human transmission and recurrentmutations is likely responsible
for the iSNV pattern observed in Figure 2A. This hypothesis is
supported by the iSNV at position 18,911: samples containing
this variant often cluster on the phylogenetic tree (Figure 2B),
although more isolated samples may represent separate muta-
tion events. More generally, pairs of samples that share an
iSNV are typically located near one another phylogenetically;
these pairs are separated by an average of 0.16 years ofCell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authors 1519
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Figure 2. Evidence for Host-to-Host Trans-
mission of Multiple Ebola Virus Makona
Genomes
(A) Certain intrahost variants (iSNVs) appear in
samples throughout the 2013–2015 EVD epidemic,
suggesting that iSNVs can be transmitted between
patients. Variants shared between two or more
samples are shown as rows of connected points;
each row is a genomic position (ordered by
position along the genome, top to bottom), and
each point indicates the presence of the iSNV in a
patient.
(B) Phylogenetic placement of derived alleles at
genomic position 18,911 implies both repeated
transmission within clades as well as some amount
of recurrent mutation. Colored tips are sized ac-
cording to frequency of iSNV at position 18,911.
Tips with small black points are those with iSNV
calls at any position; other tips represent samples
with no iSNV calls. This figure shows only the
portion of the tree relevant for this analysis; large
brancheswith no SNPs or iSNVs at position 18,911
are not shown.
See also Figure S3.evolution, whereas random pairs are separated by an average of
0.30 years (p < 104, randomization test). These results suggest
transmission of iSNVs in at least some cases and therefore
suggest that the transmission bottleneck is wide enough to facil-
itate the transmission of low- or intermediate-frequency variants
between hosts.
Viral Evolution during a Prolonged EVD Epidemic
We previously reported that new mutations accumulated more
rapidly in the viral population early in the outbreak than over
the long-term in the reservoir (Gire et al., 2014). We hypothesized
then that the higher rate early in the outbreak resulted from
incomplete purifying selection—that is, we were detecting tran-
sient nonsynonymous variants that would later be removed by
purifying selection (Pybus et al., 2007; Bedford et al., 2011).
The observed evolutionary rate is thus not an estimate of the un-1520 Cell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authorsderlying mutation rate since some delete-
rious mutations are purged by selection
before they can be detected. But neither
is it an estimate of the long-term substitu-
tion rate since other deleteriousmutations
have not been eliminated by selection at
the time of analysis. We hypothesized
that the EBOV Makona evolutionary rate
would decline following the addition of
genomes covering a longer evolutionary
timescale. Such a decline is well charac-
terized in members of other species
(Duchene et al., 2014; Ho et al., 2005).
With the present data set, we were able
to examine the evolution of the virus
over a longer time period. We found that
the most probable estimated evolutionary
rate of EBOV Makona is indeed markedlylower (mean posterior rate = 1.25 3 103 substitutions per site
per year) and is closer to the long-term rate than to the rate esti-
mated early in the outbreak (Figures 3A and S4).
How purifying selection acts at different timescales can also
be seen in the distribution of mutations in the EBOV Makona
genealogy. Deleterious mutations are more likely to result in
transmission-impaired viruses and dead-end infections and
may therefore only be present in individual patients. Mutations
unique to individual patients are those that occur on the external
branches of the phylogenetic tree, whereas internal branch mu-
tations are those present in multiple samples in our data set.
Thus, in the model of incomplete purifying selection, we expect
external branches to be characterized by a higher rate of nonsy-
nonymous substitution than internal branches; in the latter,
selection has had more opportunity to filter out deleterious mu-
tants. Internal branches, by definition, have produced multiple
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Figure 3. Ebola Virus Evolution during a
Prolonged EVD Epidemic
(A) Estimates of EBOV evolutionary rates at three
timescales: decades (yellow, all known EVD out-
breaks), months (blue, Baize + Gire + Park), and
weeks (red: Baize + Gire).
(B) Purifying selection. We estimated non-
synonymous (red) and synonymous (blue) substi-
tution rates on external (unique to an isolate,
potential dead end) and internal (shared by multi-
ple isolates, evidence of human-to-human trans-
mission) branches. Nonsynonymous mutations
accumulate faster on external branches than on
internal branches. For synonymous mutations, the
difference between external and internal branches
is less pronounced.
(C) Enrichment for nonsynonymous mutations at
shorter timescales. Intrahost (all variants that
appear within a single host at less than 100%
frequency); unique interhost (SNPs fixed in exactly
one individual); shared interhost (SNPs fixed in
two or more individuals); shared between EVD
outbreaks (internal branch SNPs on a between-
outbreak tree).
See also Figure S4.descendent lineages and are thus less likely to includemutations
with fitness costs. To test this hypothesis, we estimated the
numbers of nonsynonymous and synonymous changes on the
virus genealogy and recovered their accumulation rates (Fig-
ure 3B). Nonsynonymous mutations indeed occurred at lower
frequency on internal than on external branches, suggesting
that most are removed by purifying selection because of their
fitness costs and hence represent evolutionary dead ends. Syn-
onymous mutations, which likely have less impact on fitness,
occurred at more comparable frequencies on internal and
external branches.
The relationship between the effectiveness of purifying selec-
tion and its duration is also apparent in the overall pattern of
nonsynonymous mutations in our data set. Selection filters the
accumulation of coding variants in the EBOV genome (Figures
3C and 4A). Nonsynonymous mutations, which are more likely
to be deleterious, make up a decreasing fraction of coding mu-
tations as we analyze longer timescales: intrahost variants > in-
dividual patients (external branches) > multiple patients (internal
branches) > between outbreaks. The fraction seen between out-
breaks represents the effect of long periods of evolution in the
unknown EBOV reservoir. As selection acts to remove delete-
rious alleles over time, fewer nonsynonymous mutations can
be detected. This pattern holds true across the EBOV Makona
genome (Figure 4A).
Possible Host Effects on the Viral Genome
Although we observe less constraint on nonsynonymous
changes during the 2013–2015 epidemic than between out-
breaks, one anomaly is the genomic sequence encoding the
mucin-like domain of the EBOV glycoprotein (GP), for which
we observe more nonsynonymous substitutions than expected
under neutrality, both within and between EVD outbreaks. Selec-tive pressure acting on a region can be estimated with the
standard statistic dN/dS, which has an expected value of 1.0
for neutral evolution and less than 1 for purifying selection; in
the mucin-like domain, the mean posterior dN/dS within this
outbreak is 4.74, and between outbreaks is 1.44 (Figure 4A).
GP is the only surface-exposed viral protein on EBOV virions,
and as such, it is the primary target of antibodies (Murin et al.,
2014). This finding therefore raises the possibility that antibodies
might be driving diversifying selection and rapid evolution in this
region. This observation is based on a very small number of sub-
stitutions (eight nonsynonymous and four synonymouswithin the
outbreak), however, and is not statistically significant (posterior
probability that dN/dS is elevated within-outbreak = 92.9%); the
situation should be clarified as more sequencing becomes avail-
able. If diversifying selection is occurring here, then the observed
changes are very unlikely to represent population-level selection
for transmission among humans; this would only occur if previ-
ously infected individuals were frequently being exposed to
new infections. Instead, we hypothesize that these changes
represent within-host selection for EBOV to escape a developing
humoral immune response.
To test the hypothesis that antibodies drive diversifying selec-
tion of GP, we looked for enrichment of mutations within B cell
epitopes within that protein. Effective humoral immunity de-
pends on antibody binding to specific B cell epitopes (Becquart
et al., 2014; Murin et al., 2014). Using experimentally determined
B cell epitopes obtained from the Virus Pathogen Database and
Analysis Resource (ViPR; Pickett et al., 2012), we found that non-
synonymousmutations in GP do indeed occurmore frequently in
epitopes than expected by chance (Figure 4B). This correlation
supports the hypothesis that humoral immunity exerts selective
pressure on the virus, driving immune evasion via accumulation
of nonsynonymous mutations within GP B cell epitopes.Cell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authors 1521
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Figure 4. Evidence for Host Effects on Ebola
Virus Makona Evolution
(A) Nonsynonymous variants are enriched in the
mucin-like domain of GP. Estimates of log(u)
(a.k.a., log(dN/dS)) per coding sequence within the
Western African EVD outbreak (left) and between
EVD outbreaks (right) demonstrate gene-specific
patterns of natural selection.
(B) Nonsynonymous variants are enriched in
B cell epitopes of GP. We calculated the frac-
tions of nonsynonymous (NS) and synonymous
(S) consensus SNPs and intrahost variants
(iSNVs) within experimentally determined B cell
epitopes (data from ViPR; Pickett et al., 2012).
Dotted line represents the fraction of GP
amino acids in ViPR epitopes. Nonsynonymous
SNPs (p = 0.004) and iSNVs (p = 0.037) in GP
occur more frequently in epitopes than expected
by chance (two-sided exact binomial test).
Numbers indicate fraction of each variant type
within GP epitope regions. Error bars represent
binomial sampling intervals.
(C) Local enrichment of T-to-C mutations within
GP B cell epitopes. We observed five sequences
with short stretches (<200 nucleotides) of
concentrated T-to-C mutations. Of these five se-
quences, two (shown here, samples 20141582
and G5119.1) contain stretches of T-to-C SNPs
(blue points) within GP epitopes (light blue bars).
Additionally, we observe a T-to-C mutation at
amino acid position 485 (blue diamond) in three
samples (one shown here, G4955.1), which is
otherwise completely conserved among members
of all ebolavirus species (Olal et al., 2012).
(D) Genome-wide increase in T-to-C mutations.
We observe more T-to-C transitions within the
2013–2015 outbreak than any other transition,
after correcting for nucleotide content. Error bars
represent binomial sampling intervals.
(E and F) Elevated T-to-C rates are genomewide but are limited to a subset of sequences. Accumulation of mutation increases linearly with time. However, some
individual samples show more genetic distance than expected based on sample date. Samples with short stretches of T-to-C mutations (orange) show a
significant enrichment of T-to-C mutations, as expected. Excluding these samples, the top 5% of samples by genetic distance (yellow) lack localized stretches
but still show moderate enrichment of T-to-C mutations genome wide. The bottom 95% of samples (beige) show no enrichment of T-to-C mutations. Error bars
represent binomial sampling intervals.Visual inspection identified a subset of sequences that are
more likely to contain B cell escape variants (Figure 4C). In
particular, three sequences (e.g., G4955.1) had a threonine-to-
alanine mutation at GP amino acid position 485, a conserved
threonine that is required for in vivo protection by the 14G7 anti-
body (Olal et al., 2012). Additionally, two sequences had short
stretches of T-to-C mutations in GP (four or more T-to-C muta-
tions within a 200 nucleotide region; Figure 4C), both of which
occur within B cell epitopes.
Similar patterns of excess T-to-C mutations within short re-
gions were also observed by Tong et al. (2015). In our data set
of 318 genomes, five possessed obvious stretches of T-to-Cmu-
tations within short regions. We also tested more broadly
whether excessive T-to-C mutations occurred in all sequences
and found a significant enrichment of T-to-C transitions relative
to all other types of transitions (Figure 4D). To determine whether
viral sequence divergence is related to T-to-C transition enrich-
ment, we compared relative T-to-C transition rates in sequences1522 Cell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authorswith stretches of T-to-C mutations (n = 5) to the top 5% of
remaining sequences by sequence divergence (n = 15) and to
the bottom 95% of sequences (n = 298) (Figure 4E). While the
sequences with T-to-C stretches showed the strongest T-to-C
enrichment, we foundmoderate enrichment of T-to-C transitions
in the 5% most divergent sequences.
DISCUSSION
Our findings from 232 EBOVMakona genomes sampled in Sierra
Leone over 7 months during the 2013–2015 EVD outbreak in
Western Africa demonstrate the value of continued sequencing
throughout an epidemic. We tracked the movement of EBOV
throughout Sierra Leone and determined the frequency of
EBOV movement into and out of that country. Although it is not
unlikely that the virus continued to cross the national borders
of Sierra Leone throughout the epidemic, these observations
suggest that, at least in late 2014, cross-border introductions
were not an important factor in the development of the epidemic.
Wewere unable, however, to draw any conclusions about export
to Guinea since few EBOV sequences from there are currently
available.
The sequence data display EBOV Makona evolution in the
context of prolonged human-to-human transmission and pro-
vide an updated view of genomic diversity. Based on the rates
of nonsynonymous and synonymous changes that are shared
or are unique to an individual host, we concluded that purifying
selection becomes increasingly effective over time, as it has
more opportunity to remove deleterious mutants.
While the effects of purifying selection in this extended EVD
outbreak are clear, these evolutionary changes do not imply
that positive selection or adaptation to humans are occurring.
Rather, the data suggest that evolutionary changes over time
through natural selection are sufficient to remove newly arisen
alleles that are less fit in the human environment. To date, no
published study has found experimental evidence of selection
for alleles beneficial to the virus within the current outbreak.
It is important to recognize, however, that the long-term hu-
man-to-human transmission observed during the 2013–2015
EVD outbreak is historically unique for EBOV. At the beginning
of each EVD outbreak, EBOV enters the human population
with little or no genetic diversity. In the case of the current EVD
outbreak, EBOV has now maintained fitness while expanding
across a much larger space of genetic diversity than in previous
EVD outbreaks, the largest of which comprised only 318 human
infections. This degree of diversity will undoubtedly affect re-
searchers’ ongoing efforts to develop or improve candidate di-
agnostics, vaccines, and therapeutics for EVD, many of which
are targeting EBOV sequences directly (PCR, nucleic-acid
based therapeutics) or indirectly (antibody cocktails).
The mucin-like domain of the EBOV glycoprotein, in contrast
to the rest of the EBOV genome, appeared to be under diversi-
fying selection based on a high ratio of nonsynonymous-to-syn-
onymousmutations. While not statistically significant because of
the small number of SNPs in the region, our observation is in
agreement with many previous studies (Sanchez et al., 1998;
Wertheim and Worobey, 2009). As the EBOV GP, especially
the mucin-like domain, is the target of many antibodies, a plau-
sible hypothesis is that the humoral immune response exerts
selective pressure on GP, resulting in an accumulation of nonsy-
nonymous mutations. In support of this hypothesis, regions of
GP corresponding to experimentally determined B cell epitopes
are significantly enriched in nonsynonymous, but not in synony-
mous, variants. There are two important caveats to this analysis:
(1) these epitopes are determined in vitro and therefore may not
be epitopes in vivo if they are not immunodominant, and (2) there
is no experimental evidence to suggest that the majority of
observed variants disrupt antibody binding to these epitopes.
While further experimental testing is required to validate an
immune evasion hypothesis, we have highlighted a few prime
candidates to consider. Genomes from three samples share a
threonine-to-alanine mutation at GP amino acid position 485, a
position that is conserved among all members of the Ebolavirus
genus. This position is indispensable for binding of the protective
antibody 14G7 (Olal et al., 2012); the observed variant at this site
may therefore be the result of escape from antibody-mediatedselection. Additionally, two samples each possess multiple
mutations within a single experimental B cell epitope in GP,
which are likely to evade antibody recognition if those regions
are relevant epitopes in vivo.
Intriguingly, the two samples with multiple mutations within a
single B cell epitope each possess a distinct short stretch littered
with T-to-C transitions, a phenomenon also observed in Tong
et al. (2015). Excessive T-to-C and A-to-G mutation of virus ge-
nomes has been observed previously as a result of adenosine
deaminases acting on RNA (ADARs; Ge´linas et al., 2011; Zahn
et al., 2007; Carpenter et al., 2009).When acting on viral genomic
RNA, ADARs cause a pattern of excess A-to-G transitions that
are represented by T-to-C transitions in our data set. These tran-
sitions are known to occur either promiscuously within 200
nucleotide stretches or in a sequence-specific manner; there-
fore, we investigated both possibilities. While only five of the
318 sequences in our data set contained obvious T-to-C
stretches, we showed that the top 5% of sequences by
sequence divergence, excluding the five sequences with T-to-
C stretches, were also moderately enriched for T-to-C transi-
tions across the genome. The remaining 95% of sequences
appeared to show no enrichment. We do not know whether
this phenomenon is caused by ADAR acting upon genomic
RNA, as we cannot exclude the possibility of bias by the EBOV
RNA polymerase or other effects. Additionally, it is yet unclear
whether these T-to-C mutations have an anti-viral or other effect
on viral fitness. These questions open avenues of research into
molecular mechanisms shaping EBOV evolution.
The results of some of the specific genome analysis methods
that we introduced here, while promising, will require denser
EBOV genome sampling to yield sufficient information to influ-
ence the EVD outbreak response. Among these methods is
transmission analysis, which could prove valuable for improved
understanding of hospital-based transmissions and therefore for
improved infection control. Inference of the ancestral genetic
state is often straightforward, with clear patterns of new varia-
tions layering on previously existing variations; viruses that
appear to be descended from others in the same data set are
separated only by new mutations that are seen nowhere else in
the data set. This kind of genetic relationship does not guarantee
a transmission relationship between two patients since many vi-
ruses can share identical genomes. However, since viruses with
identical genomes are often epidemiologically related (Gire et al.,
2014), we can infer that viruses that appear to descend from
other viruses in our data set are either in or epidemiologically
close to the same transmission chain.
Unfortunately, long delays of shipping samples from the
field and required changes to the EBOV inactivation protocol
caused severe degradation of many samples, which pre-
vented identification of variants and transmission analysis.
This loss should serve as a reminder that standardized and
optimized protocols for sample collection, virus deactivation,
and shipment are crucial for a rapid worldwide response to
any new infectious disease outbreak. An important future
research effort will be aimed at understanding which certified
EVD sample deactivation protocols are best suited for high-
quality genomic sequencing. Complications with sample ship-
ment also emphasize the need for establishing in-countryCell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The Authors 1523
sequencing capabilities either before or at the onset of future
EVD outbreaks (Folarin et al., 2014).
Beyond coordinated field and experimental responses, a cul-
ture of rapid data sharing is critical for teams around the world to
have the best current information about a circulating virus or
ongoing disease (Yozwiak et al., 2015). In light of this need, we
released all data discussed in this paper publicly as they were
generated, beginning in December 2014, well in advance of our
own analysis. We have previously described our high-depth
sequencing protocols (Matranga et al., 2014), and we are also
now making available our computational analysis pipeline, in the
hope that they will assist the many laboratories engaged in viral
genomic research. As more EBOV genomic data become avail-
able, inparticular for poorly coveredLiberia andGuinea, the scien-
tific community can together obtain a broader picture of transmis-
sion and evolution of EBOV Makona during the EVD epidemic.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Sample Preparation from Kenema Government Hospital
This study included 575 blood samples from 84 patients with confirmed EVD
from June 16 through September 28, 2014 by KGH laboratory staff. Clinical
samples were inactivated using QIAGEN AVL and ethanol in the KGH labora-
tory prior to shipping out of the country.
Sample Preparation from CDC Bo Laboratory
This study included 98 blood samples from 98 patients with confirmed EVD
from August 20, 2014 through January 10, 2015 by CDC laboratory staff sta-
tioned in Bo, Sierra Leone. Clinical specimens from the CDC Bo laboratory
in Sierra Leone were shipped to and stored at the Viral Special Pathogens
Branch BSL-4 laboratory at the CDC in Atlanta, GA. Samples were inactivated
and RNA was extracted using the MagMAX Pathogen RNA/DNA isolation kit
(Invitrogen) and BeadRetriever (Invitrogen). Non-infectious RNA was treated
with DNase I RNase-free (Roche) prior to shipment to the Broad Institute.
High-Throughput Sequencing
Host ribosomal and carrier poly(rA) RNA depletion, randomly primed cDNA
synthesis, Nextera XT library construction, and 101-bp paired-end Illumina
sequencing were performed as described previously (Gire et al., 2014; Ma-
tranga et al., 2014).
Ebola Virus Makona Genome Assembly and Analysis
EBOV Makona genomes were assembled from high-throughput sequencing
data using an updated bioinformatics pipeline based on our previously
described methods (Gire et al., 2014; Matranga et al., 2014). Of the collected
samples, 150 KGH and 82 CDC samples had sufficient EBOV genome
sequencing coverage for high-quality de novo genome assembly. Further
description of the pipeline can be found in the Supplemental Experimental
Procedures.
Our Linux-based software pipeline is publicly available at https://github.
com/broadinstitute/viral-ngs (Park et al., 2015). This pipeline includes com-
mand-line tools for eachof theabove stepsandoptionalSnakemakeworkflows
(Ko¨ster and Rahmann, 2012) to automate themeither sequentially or in parallel.
The assembly pipeline is also available via the DNAnexus cloud platform.
RNA paired-end reads from either HiSeq or MiSeq instruments (Illumina)
can be securely uploaded in FASTQ or BAM format and processed through
the pipeline using graphical and command-line interfaces. Instructions for
the cloud analysis pipeline are available at https://github.com/dnanexus/
viral-ngs/wiki.
Genomic Epidemiology of Ebola Virus Makona
The following publicly available EBOVMakona genomes from outside of Sierra
Leone do not carry the SL3-derived allele at position 10,218: 26 available ge-
nomes from Liberia (25 from Kugelman et al., 2015b, one from GenBank:1524 Cell 161, 1516–1526, June 18, 2015 ª2015 The AuthorsKP178538.1), and all four available genomes from Mali (Hoenen et al., 2015).
A median-joining haplotype network was constructed in PopART version
1.7.2 (http://popart.otago.ac.nz). Due to the presence of missing data, 1,492
sites (7.9% of total genome) were excluded from the analysis; these sites
included 61 sites with variability among isolates (10.9% of all variable sites).
To reconstruct the EBOV Makona transmission history within Sierra Leone,
we grouped samples into sets of one or more genetically identical viruses
based on their consensus sequences. We then identified relationships
between these groups, progressing from the Guinean reference genome
(KJ660346.2) and ending with nine viruses sampled in Freetown (eight from
our KGH and CDC cohorts and one sequenced in Italy).
Intrahost Variant Analysis
Full details of the identification and calling of intrahost variants (iSNVs) are
available in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures; iSNV calls and ana-
lyses are available in Data S1. Evolutionary distances between pairs of phylog-
eny tips were computed from the posterior sample of trees produced by
Bayesian evolutionary analysis by sampling trees (BEAST) (Drummond et al.,
2012) analysis. This calculation integrates across phylogenetic uncertainty
and produces a temporal evolutionary distance between phylogeny tips. We
used this distance matrix to calculate the average distance between pairs of
phylogeny tips that share an iSNV and compared the result to the average dis-
tance between random pairs of tips. We calculated a p value for the observed
average distance by conducting a randomization test. In each random repli-
cate, we sampled the same distribution of iSNV possessing tips as observed
in the empirical data and calculated the average distance between these pairs
of tips. We calculated a p value by comparing the empirical mean distance to
the mean distances observed over 10,000 random replicates.
GP B Cell Epitope Analysis
Data were obtained from the NIAID Virus Pathogen Database and Analysis
Resource (ViPR) online through the web site at http://www.viprbrc.org (Pickett
et al., 2012). Asmost of the epitopes in the database are based on theMayinga
reference strain, we mapped all B cell epitopes against the Guinean reference
strain (GenBank: KJ660346.2) and removed all epitopes that no longer
matched perfectly, leaving 40 B cell epitopes. Overlapping epitopes were
merged, and nonsynonymous and synonymous SNPs and iSNVs were scored
as within or outside of epitope regions. Significance was determined by two-
tailed binomial test with a = 0.05, with the null hypothesis that variants would
occur in epitope regions of GP by chancewith probability 172/676, which is the
fraction of GP residues GP within B cell epitopes.
Molecular Evolution
Three data sets were constructed to represent three timescales of genetic sur-
veillance of EBOV Makona. For surveillance between EVD outbreaks, 63 pub-
licly available sequences represent the diversity of EBOV sampled over long
periods of time; these sequences include the first recorded 1976 EVD outbreak
and other EVD outbreaks and exclude one outbreak occurring in the Demo-
craticRepublic of theCongo in 2014.Wealso includedEBOVgenome fragment
sequences from possibly infected great ape carcasses and frugivorous bats.
Fourteen sequences fromWestern Africa were chosen to represent the current
2013–2015 EVD outbreak. For surveillance of the early outbreak, 81 sequences
(Baize et al., 2014; Gire et al., 2014) were reanalyzed, representing the earliest
epidemiologically relevant and publicly available sequences. For surveillance
of the prolonged epidemic, 232 EBOV genomes reported here were combined
with five sequences from repatriated healthcare workers (UK1, UK2, UK3,
INMI1, GE1) and the 81 sequences from the early outbreak data set.
Analyses of rates, phylogenies, and evolution were performed on all three
data sets in BEAST (Drummond et al., 2012). Full details on themodels and pa-
rameters are available in the Supplemental Experimental Procedures. All
BEAST inputs, outputs, and analysis scripts are available in Data S2.
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